
A malicious script slipped into pages run by 178 organizations on November 16, among them BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax, according to security firm Report URI. The injected code was built to divert cryptocurrency transfers, capture payment-card details and plant attack toolkits aimed at Apple devices. Rather than breaking into each target individually, the intruders planted their payload inside Optimizely Web, a platform companies use to test different versions of their pages, so every site that loaded the script treated it as legitimate.
- Key Point: Report URI reviewed 1,611 Optimizely files and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organizations across banking, technology, retail, streaming and media.
- Key Point: The script replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses found in page text, forms and the clipboard with addresses controlled by the attackers.
- Key Point: On Apple devices it loaded two attack kits, Coruna and DarkSword, which target older iOS versions.
- Key Point: Attackers’ wallets had received roughly USD 7,040, almost entirely in bitcoin, by 19:25 UTC on the day of the campaign.
A single testing tool as the entry point
Scott Helme, the researcher who founded Report URI, said the attackers did not compromise each site separately. Their code sat on Optimizely’s server, which meant the script arrived through a channel the sites already trusted. What remains unclear is how the intruders gained access to so many unrelated customer accounts. Helme noted that Optimizely’s server delivered exactly what it was given, so the incident was not a tampering of its content delivery network.
Once running, the payload scanned the visible text of a page, its forms and the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses, then swapped in the attackers’ own. A user who copied an address to send funds could end up pasting a different one. The code also recorded card numbers, expiration dates and security codes typed into a site’s own forms, though payments completed inside external processors’ windows stayed beyond its reach. Cookies and screenshots were shipped out as well.
Apple devices and a telltale reload
On iPhones and iPads the script pulled in the Coruna and DarkSword kits, which Report URI says are aimed at earlier releases of iOS. One visible sign was an iPhone page on iOS 18.6 or older reloading itself every 60 seconds. Whether the code actually worked in every case, and how many victims it claimed, has not been established. An analysis by MATT Research indicates the kits were demonstrably delivered, but does not show a successful infection of a real device.
Helme said it is not known how the attackers obtained access to so many client accounts with no relationship to one another.
The first injection Report URI detected appeared at 04:21 UTC on November 16 on the BBC’s page. By 19:25, the attackers’ wallets held about USD 7,040, nearly all in bitcoin, and the program had been rebuilt 26 times over the course of the day. A mass cleanup began around 20:40 UTC, and by 23:11 the firm observed that every file was clean. The attackers’ main server stopped responding on November 17, and Optimizely acknowledged the incident on its status page.
Corporate responses and weak site defenses
Salesforce said it was investigating unauthorized changes to Optimizely scripts and had disabled them as a precaution. Equifax stopped using the platform and said it found no evidence that its systems were compromised. IKEA said it was assessing the possible impact on its services and customers.
The report also gauged how well the affected sites were protected. Of 256 servers examined, 68 lacked a content security policy, the rule that limits which scripts a page may load. Only 24, or 15%, blocked the malicious code.
Report URI advised anyone who visited one of the affected sites that day to update their iPhone or iPad, confirm that crypto transfers reached the intended address and review card statements. The firm said it cannot determine how many cards, cookies or screenshots were stolen, nor how many iOS devices were infected before the campaign was shut down.
The episode puts a spotlight on the supply chain behind page-testing tools: a single trusted vendor can hand an attacker a foothold across hundreds of unrelated brands at once. The low share of sites enforcing a content security policy suggests many organizations had no technical backstop once the script arrived from an approved source. With the attackers’ server offline, the immediate threat has faded, but the open question of how the Optimizely accounts were accessed leaves room for a repeat.
